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In February 1997 Maynilad Water Services, Inc. and Manila Water Company, Inc. were awarded 
concession contracts from Manila’s Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) 
and split between them the service areas in Metro Manila. In the years thereafter, the paths taken 
by the two concessionaires diverged dramatically: Maynilad became bankrupt and was turned 
over to MWSS, whereas Manila Water has prospered and is now a listed company in the 
Philippine Stock Exchange. The coexistence of two concessionaires in the same city offers a rare 
opportunity as a natural experiment to study the role of internal factors in privatization of urban 
water systems because the effects of many important external factors, such as political support, 
regulatory structure, and unforeseen events, are effectively controlled. Our findings suggest that 
corporate governance, financial management, and operations management of privatized water 
utilities are among the most important internal factors that determine success of water 
privatization in developing countries.  
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Introduction 
 The 1990s saw an unprecedented wave of water privatization around the world. Public 
water utilities’ failure to expand service coverage and improve service quality prompted 
municipalities in many developing countries to turn to the private sector for investment capital, 
technical expertise, and efficiency improvement (Dosi and Easter, 2003). In addition, water 
privatization was perceived as a means to end government subsidization by ―depoliticizing‖ water 
pricing; public water utilities often priced water and sanitation services at below cost-recovery 
level, creating enormous financial burdens for governments in developing countries. The political 
environment during the decade was highly favorable to water privatization as pro-market 
politicians rose to leadership positions in many countries and international financial institutions 
were actively promoting market-oriented reforms in the developing world through loans and 
technical assistance programs (Hall et al., 2005). By the end of 2000 at least 93 countries had 
experimented with water privatization in one form or another (Brubaker, 2001).  
 The ―exuberant enthusiasm‖ for the water privatization, however, was soon subdued by 
harsh realities marked by renegotiation, termination, and cancellation of privatization contracts 
and projects. A World Bank database on infrastructure revealed that by 2002, 75% of contracts 
for water privatization in Latin America and the Caribbean had gone sour, experiencing either 
renegotiation or cancellation (Gómez-Ibáñez et al., 2004). In Asia the rate of water privatization 
has slowed considerably since the Asian financial crisis, as a number of high-profile water 
privatization projects have been abandoned or canceled due to disputes over water tariff increases 
(Hall et al., 2004).  
Some critics have argued that water privatization is ill-fated because the public benefits 
of water services are inherently incompatible with the profit motive of the private sector 
(Estanche at al, 2001; Birdsall and Nellis, 2002; Smith and Hanson, 2003). Others have held that 
water privatization compromises access to water as basic human right and that it harms the 
welfare of the poor (Gleick et al., 2004; Scanlon et al., 2004).  
 3 
Although arguments against water privatization have gained currency in recent years, the 
urgency of the water crises that led to privatizations during the 1990s remains unchanged to the 
present day: more than 1.1 billion people worldwide lack safe drinking water, and 2.4 billion lack 
adequate sanitation (Kessides, 2004). The situation is especially acute for many rapidly growing 
small cities in developing countries: more than half of the residents in these cities do not have 
water connections (Hewett and Montgomery, 2001). Inadequate urban water supply systems 
place a greater financial burden on the urban poor, as a disproportionately high percentage of 
poorer households lack access to piped water (Johnstone and Wood, 2001; Marvin and Laurie, 
1999). Studies have shown that unit costs for water from vendors (who often supply to the urban 
poor) can be as much as more than ten times higher than for water from piped connections (Crane, 
1994; Chogull and Chogull, 1996).  
 The importance of access to safe drinking water to poverty reduction is highlighted by the 
stated intention of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to halve the number of people 
without safe water access by 2015. Enormous financial resources are needed to reach this 
ambitious goal; estimates from the World Bank early in the new century indicated that developing 
countries would need $60 billion for the water sector over the next ten years (Haarmeyer and Coy, 
2002). It is clearly unrealistic to expect governments in developing countries to finance this 
development entirely on their own. Private sector participation will continue to be among the few 
options available to municipalities in many developing countries, and especially to the increasing 
number of fast-growing small and medium-sized cities.  
 Meanwhile, despite the many criticisms leveled at water privatization, no empirical 
evidence has emerged to suggest that funding problems are so inherent in the water supply sector 
as to pose insurmountable barriers to privatization. In fact, one recent study (Galiani et al., 2005) 
has shown that water privatization reduced child mortality by 5% to 7% in Argentina, with the 
largest gains in reduction experienced by the poorest population. Although some research has 
shown that efficiency was not significantly different in private and state-run water operations 
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(Estache and Rossi, 2002; Kirkpatrick et al., 2004), no empirical study has confirmed claims that 
private water companies are necessarily less efficient than their public counterparts or that water 
privatization hurts the urban poor. Given the importance of private sector participation to the 
success of global efforts to alleviate inadequate and unsafe water supplies, it is of paramount 
importance to understand where, when, and how water privatization could be successfully 
implemented.  
 The voluminous literature on water privatization offers little information about the impact 
of privatized water utilities’ management practices on how privatization has fared in developing 
countries. Studies of previous water privatization cases have typically focused on external factors 
such as political support, institutional structure, design of contract, transparency of bidding 
process, public perception, and impacts of unforeseeable events (Johnstone et al., 2001; Shirley 
and Menard, 2002). These factors, undoubtedly critical determinants in the success or failure of 
water privatization, are nevertheless external conditions in the sense that they are outside the 
control of privatized water utilities. We argue here that privatization involves transformation in 
ownership structure and organizational culture within water utilities, and that how the 
transformation is managed at the company level has a direct bearing on the outcome of 
privatization.  
 One plausible explanation for the lack of scholarly work on the impacts of internal factors 
on water privatization is that it is methodologically challenging to assess what these internal 
factors are and how they function. First, it is fairly difficult to disentangle the effects of internal 
factors from those of external factors, as they are often intermixed and shaped by particular 
conditions, such that case studies detailing water privatization in a specific locality cannot 
usefully generate definite conclusions about the effects of internal factors. Second, external 
factors are often more visible and thus more tractable analytically than internal factors, because it 
is easier to obtain information on external factors than on internal factors, which may not be 
readily available in the public domain. Third, statistical tools such as regression analysis may 
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offer only limited insights on internal factors because localized peculiarities can be hard to 
quantify and to compare meaningfully.  
 The recent history of water privatization in Metro Manila presents a unique opportunity 
as a natural experiment to analyze and compare the effects of internal factors on the success of 
privatization efforts in an urban context. When MWSS was privatized in 1997, metropolitan 
Manila was divided into two zones and concession contracts were accordingly awarded to two 
companies, Maynilad (West Zone) and Manila Water (East Zone). Because the two 
concessionaires faced the same external factors—e.g., political support, institutional structure, 
contract design, transparency of bidding process, and locally shared unforeseen events—the 
analyst can concentrate on differences in internal factors and study the effects of these differences 
on the success and failure of water privatization.  
 Discussion below begins by developing theoretical linkages between water privatization 
and three internal factors: corporate governance, financial management, and operations 
management. An overview of the evolution of water privatization in Metro Manila sets the stage 
for analysis and comparison of the performance of the two concessionaires after privatization, in 
terms of how differences in internal factors have contributed to the different paths that they took 
and the outcomes they experienced. Final discussion summarizes important results of the analysis 
and addresses their implications for water privatization policy and for innovation in public water 
utilities. 
 
Internal Factors and Water Privatization: Theoretical Linkages 
 Because privatization of public services such as water utilities entails complex changes in 
economic, social, and even political structure, the process is unquestionably shaped by various 
external factors such as political environment and regulatory structures. But privatization also 
involves transformations in ownership structure, organizational culture and operations 
management; how such transformations are managed, at the company level, has direct bearing on 
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the outcome of privatization. In the present case, some theoretical linkages can be made between 
internal factors (such as corporate governance, financial management, and operations 
management) and success of water privatization.  
 
Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance refers to the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
different participants in a corporation (the board, managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders) 
and the rules and procedures that have been adopted for making decisions on corporate affairs 
(OECD, 1999). Three fundamental principles of corporate governance are accountability, 
transparency, and responsibility.  Improvements in corporate governance are an important 
mechanism by which privatization may enhance performance.  
 For example, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) often suffer from a principal-agent problem 
whereby managers cannot be easily held accountable for their actions. Privatized corporate 
governance offers the prospect of tighter control of employee performance by linking job tenure 
directly to performance and accountability. Yet experiences in privatization in recent decades 
have shown that transfer of ownership cannot guarantee improvement in corporate governance 
(Dyck, 2001). Nestor (2005) observes that newly privatized companies with a widely dispersed 
body of owners may fall prey to managerial opportunism—a problem that can become especially 
pronounced in developing countries where market mechanisms for corporate control have not 
become well established. In many transition economies, weak corporate governance has been 
exploited to loot state resources through the privatization process itself (Black et al., 2000).  
Some unique features of water privatization pose particular challenges to corporate 
governance. First, because water is perceived as an essential good, privatized water companies 
are often subjected to close scrutiny from the public, who are likely to expect high standards of 
corporate governance. Aguas Argentinas SA (AASA), the private water company in Buenos 
Aires, experienced this firsthand: the company’s reluctance to employ competitive bidding in 
 7 
selecting contracts and its refusal to share information about its contractors bred public distrust 
and growing hostility, not only toward AASA itself but also toward the Argentine government 
and regulatory agency (Bosman, 2005). Because consumers are such important stakeholders in 
privatized water utilities, these companies must adopt a broad concept of corporate governance 
that recognizes public satisfaction as a primary goal. 
Second, the very nature of water supply technology (which involves high fixed capital 
costs and increasing rate of return) determines that water utilities are natural monopolies whether 
in governmental or in private hands.  Thus market competition as an external mechanism for 
effective corporate control is almost nonexistent in the water sector, and regulatory agencies are 
the arbiter of last resort. However, regulatory agencies often suffer from information asymmetry, 
and their effectiveness may be further reduced by the general weakness in regulatory capacity 
found in many developing countries.  
 Third, because of the substantial financial and human resources needed to operate urban 
water systems, privatized water utilities are often formed as joint ventures among several partners, 
typically some combination of domestic and foreign interests. Although a strategic alliance 
among these different partners is necessitated by political, legal, financial, and technical 
considerations, the potential for conflicts of interest among them cannot be underestimated. Bad 
corporate governance can quickly lead to internal conflicts that may bring out the worst in all 
involved (Bamford and Ernst, 2005).  
 The fourth challenge confronting privatized water utilities is that water privatization often 
involves conglomerates that control many subsidiaries through a complex web of pyramiding and 
cross-holding
1. Directors within these groups often sit on each other’s governing boards. 
Resulting effects include little independent scrutiny of individual company management and 
considerably weakened shareholder discipline (Nestor, 2005). Controlling shareholders could 
potentially expropriate the benefits of minority shareholders and other stakeholders through 
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related-party transactions that are likely to be detrimental to the operations of the privatized water 
utilities as well as to the public interest.  
 
Financial Management 
 A primary consideration for water privatization in developing countries is the need to 
attract private investments into the water sector, but these private investments often do not come 
cheap. Newly privatized water companies require substantial amounts of capital for settling labor 
issues as well as system renovation and expansion, and they must rely heavily on capital markets 
to finance the deficit. However, because newly privatized companies are not ―known‖ in financial 
markets and carry the baggage of past public governance, access to credit is expensive (Ozkaya 
and Askari, 1999). In many developing countries where a domestic capital market is not well 
established, the only accessible sources may be foreign, a very expensive option because of the 
substantial amount of risk involved.  
Uncertainty regarding regulatory actions and consumers’ sensitivity to tariff increases 
further heighten the risks involved in water privatization projects. Haarmeyer and Mody (1997) 
describe the evolution of private financing in the water sector as a three-step process. The first 
step is limited-recourse financing, which is typically expensive because of risks within the sector 
as well as uncertainties associated with early development stages. The second step is financing 
through returned earnings, once a stable set of rate-paying customers has been achieved and 
confidence in the regulatory process has grown. The third step is bond financing, much cheaper 
than limited-recourse financing but only available for utilities with a track record of stable 
revenue sources. Privatized water companies might become financially stressed in the early 
stages of development, not because they fail to achieve efficiency gains but because such gains 
fall short of covering the expensive limited-recourse financing. Prudent financial management 
from the outset is thus a key to the success of the water privatization in developing countries. 
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 In preparing bids for water privatization, potential bidders may suffer from the so-called 
―winner’s curse‖ by underestimating the effects of potential risks such as political risk, current 
risk, and financial risk. This may improve the prospects of winning concessions, but such bids 
may become unsustainable when unforeseeable setbacks arise. Water privatization in Buenos 
Aires, for example, had been seen as a huge success until, in the wake of the convertibility crisis 
between 2000 and 2002, the privatized utility found itself heavily indebted but unable to attract 
fresh capital to cover contractual obligations.  
   
Operations Management 
 Water privatization involves two crucial activities at which privatized water utilities 
rarely excel: the transformation of a public utility to a private company, and management of 
public expectations. Employees in public water utilities, as in other SOEs, are often guaranteed 
life-long employment and thus are not motivated to improve performance. Developing an 
efficient incentive system is an essential part of organizational restructuring in newly privatized 
firms (Ozkaya and Askari, 1999). Employees in the public sector are also often slow in 
responding to customers’ demands because there is almost no competition to supply the services 
they provide. Concessionaires’ ability to build an organizational culture that promotes a 
commercial, customer-driven working environment is essential to the success of the 
transformation from public to private water company.  
 Management of public expectations is of critical importance to a privatized water utility’s 
survival. Because water is perceived as essential good, there is often controversy over whether the 
private sector is fit to operate the water system. In addition, public water utilities generally keep 
prices below costs; the expectation usually is that privatization will not change that. Although this 
is virtually always an unrealistic notion, how to contend with imperatives for price increases in 
the face of unrealistic public expectations is a challenging task. A recent World Bank study 
discovered that most water and sewerage projects that were canceled had been confronted with 
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conflicts between price increases and difficulties in collecting from consumers (Harris, et al., 
2003). 
Two useful strategies for dispelling opposition to water privatization are to build 
corporate legitimacy and to establish strategic alliances. Although concession agreements may 
contain mandates that privatized water companies must establish their legitimacy as customer-
focused companies commensurate with their private sector status, such legitimacy could be 
challenged because of the natural monopoly that characterizes water utilities and because of 
information asymmetry. Privatized water companies can build corporate legitimacy through 
disclosure to customers and image management (Ogden and Clarke, 2005). In many developing 
countries, the most likely allies in support of a privatized water utility would be the urban poor 
who do not have water connections. They often pay several times more than connected residents 
while suffering from the worst service quality (Johnstone and Wood, 2001). Privatized water 
companies can significantly strengthen their corporate legitimacy by aligning their interests with 
those among the poor who strongly demand coverage for underserved communities.  
 In the following two sections, we show that the water privatization in Manila offers a rare 
opportunity as a natural experiment to study the effects of the above internal factors on water 
privatization.  
 
Water Privatization in Manila 
 Comprised of 12 cities and 5 municipalities, Metro Manila has 11 million inhabitants, 
about 13% of the total population of the Philippines, and is densely populated, with about 16,000 
persons per square kilometer. Privatization of water services was first proposed in the mid-1990s 
when MWSS, the state-owned water utility responsible for providing water and sanitation for 
Metro Manila, had become unable to expand coverage adequately to a rapidly growing population. 
By 1996, MWSS was only able to supply an average of 16 hours of water per day to two-thirds of 
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its coverage population. Its efficiency as measured by nonrevenue water (NRW)
2
 and number of 
staff per 1000 connections was the lowest among major cities (see Table 1).  
 The urban poor were hurt the most by MWSS’s ineffective and inefficient operations. 
According to a 1995 household survey, poor households that relied on private water vendors paid 
prices up to 13 times higher than the rates for MWSS household water connections (David and 
Inocencio, 1998). Furthermore, with water and sanitation services priced below costs, MWSS had 
to rely on periodic government subsidies to service its debts, placing a heavy financial burden to 
the government.  
 Water privatization thus appeared to be an attractive solution to the looming water crisis. 
The Ramos administration believed that water privatization could improve operations efficiency, 
raise financial resources for water investments, and end the need for government subsidies (David, 
2001). In 1995 the Water Crisis Act was enacted, giving the president the authority to privatize 
MWSS within one year. The government wasted no time in laying the groundwork, which was 
closely patterned on Buenos Aires’ example. The water tariff was increased by 38% in August 
1996 in anticipation of pressures for an increase during the process of privatization; in the 
meantime, the MWSS labor force was cut by 30%. Both strategies had helped to boost private 
sector interest in participating in water privatization (Dumol, 2000).  
International financial institutions were closely involved in the privatization process from 
the very beginning. In 1995 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided a technical assistance 
(TA) grant amounting to US$582,000 as a part of its Umiray–Angat Transbasin Project, to assist 
MWSS in promoting privatization activities. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the 
World Bank acted as the lead advisor for the design and the implementation of water privatization.  
 A critical feature in the design of water privatization in Manila was that the service areas 
in Metro Manila are divided into two zones (see Figure 1), which according to the bidding rule 
cannot be operated by a single concessionaire. There were three reasons for the split: (1) it gave 
regulators more leverage in their negotiations with concessionaires; (2) it provided opportunities 
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for benchmark comparisons between the two zones; and (3) the arrangement served as a safety 
valve, such that if one concessionaire got into financial trouble, the other concessionaire could 
take over (Dumol, 2000).  
 In January 1997, in what has been known as the world’s largest water privatization deal, 
competitive bidding was held to privatize MWSS. Four consortia submitted bids for both the East 
and West Zones. In accordance with the rules for the bidding, the Maynilad Company, a joint 
venture by Suez and Benpres Holding (controlled by the Lopez family), was awarded the 
concession contract for the West Zone; the Manila Water Company, Inc., a joint venture by Ayala, 
United Utilities, and Bechtel, was awarded the East Zone. Both concession contracts were to last 
25 years, and the targets for improvement in service coverage, water quality, service quality, and 
reduction in NRW were specified in the contracts. The two concessionaires in combination were 
expected to increase water supply coverage from the then-current 67% level to 85% by 2001, and 
to 96% by 2006 and beyond. In addition, the two concessionaires were to pay roughly US$1.2 
billion in concession fees
3
 over the 25-year period to service existing debts of MWSS and to 
finance operations of the MWSS Regulatory Office, which had been established to oversee the 
implementation of concession contracts.  
 The concession contracts also specified tariff adjustment mechanisms. Three grounds 
were deemed acceptable for rate adjustments: inflation, extraordinary price adjustment (EPA), 
and rate-rebasing. The concessionaires would be allowed to adjust base rates automatically 
according to the consumer price index. Tariffs could be adjusted annually to recoup the financial 
effects of certain events unforeseeable to the concessionaires, such as sharp devaluation and 
changes in laws and regulations. A rate-rebasing exercise would be conducted every five years so 
that return on investment, or appropriate discount rate (ADR), would not exceed a fair return. The 
original intention of rate-rebasing was that the concessionaires would be allowed to reap 
efficiency gains during the interval of two consecutive rate-rebasing exercises; rate adjustments 
every five years would ensure that consumers also shared the benefits of the efficiency 
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improvement. Unfortunately, tariff adjustments through rate-rebasing became a major source of 
tension and controversy soon after privatization because both the level of ADR and the validation 
of various assumptions for computing rates of investment were subject to regulatory discretion.  
 Another critical feature of water privatization in Manila was the extremely low bids 
offered by the two winning consortia—especially by Manila Water, which proposed a base rate 
amounting to only one-fourth of MWSS tariffs at the time of bidding (see Table 2). In fact, the 
bid was so low that officials administering the bidding process had to confirm with Manila Water 
that it was indeed the water tariff that was meant, and not the discount (Dumol, 2000). The 
overall impression among the policy makers was that the generally low bids reflected both the 
inefficiency in MWSS and the private sector’s confidence. In retrospect, although the low bids 
ensured an easy sell of the concession agreements to water consumers in Metro Manila, they 
planted the seeds for public outcry about rate hikes in the years following the privatization 
process.  
 Two unforeseen events deeply undermined the financial models used by the two winning 
consortia in the bidding process, making them grossly inaccurate. The first was that just after the 
concessions were granted, the Angat Reservoir, from which 98% of Manila’s water supply is 
drawn, had experienced an unprecedented drought; the amount of water available to the two 
concessionaires decreased by 30%. The second was the Asian financial crisis under which 
currency devaluation almost doubled MWSS’s dollar-dominated debt service burden. The 
financial obligation for the two concessionaires increased accordingly, as the concession 
agreements had stipulated that MWSS debt service was to be paid for from concession fees
4
. The 
financial crisis also made it more expensive for the concessionaires to access financial market for 
their capital investment projects, because of the sudden jump in risk premiums.  
 Not surprisingly, the low tariffs that were to be achieved through water privatization 
proved ―too good to be true‖ (Fabella, 2006); tariffs began to rise gradually through 2001 and 
accelerated after October 2001, when contract amendment was granted by the Regulatory Office 
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(see Table 3). In the public eye and among civil society groups the government had been 
perceived as fairly accommodating to the two concessionaires’ demands. A foreign currency 
differential adjustment (FCDA) was granted to allow the concessionaires to automatically recover 
from the foreign currency losses at an accelerated rate, and the appropriate discount rate (ADR) 
was adjusted significantly upwards in the rate-rebasing process held in 2002. In addition to 
accelerated recovery of foreign currency losses and higher ADR, targets for expansion and NRW 
were also adjusted downward in the contract amendment so that the two concessionaires could 
reduce their capital expenditure requirement in the early years of operation. 
 These substantial rate increases and lowered targets granted by the Regulatory Office 
nevertheless failed to prevent Maynilad from descending into bankruptcy in 2003. The firm never 
made a profit during its eight years in operation. At the start of its concession Maynilad had 
targeted a reduction in NRW from 64% in 1997 to 31% in 2001; instead NRW rose to 69%, and 
as result the volume of billed water was only half of the target level. Maynilad stopped paying its 
concession fee in April 2001, despite the numerous rate increases that had allowed it to recover 
foreign exchange rate losses due to the Asian financial crisis. The unpaid concession fees had 
accumulated to over Php 6.8 billion by the end of 2003, forcing MWSS to assume short-term 
loans to service the debts. In December 2002 Maynilad filed a notice of termination of its 
concession contract, blaming the government for the firm’s difficulties in sustaining business in 
the West Zone and seeking reimbursement of more than US$303 million that the firm claimed to 
have invested. Bankruptcy was formally declared in November 2003, after the international 
arbitration panel ruled in favor of MWSS. Court documents show that Maynilad had accumulated 
unsecured liabilities of Php 17.4 billion against recoverable assets of only Php 2.4 billion. In 2005 
Maynilad was turned over to MWSS under a so-called debt-for-equity swap, in which Benpres 
relinquished its shares to MWSS and other creditors in exchange for unpaid concession fees and 
debts.  
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 Manila Water took a completely different path. Although its bids seemed to be 
unrealistically low at the outset and even more so in light of the unanticipated events that 
followed, and although it missed some key targets in early years after the privatization, the 
company performed well financially. Its NRW was reduced from 58% in 1997 to 35% in 2005. 
Remarkably, the company had begun to make a profit by 1999, when water in the East Zone was 
selling at a huge discount off the pre-privatization rate, and it has been profitable ever since. In 
2004 Manila Water posted net income of Php 1.335 billion. On March 18, 2005, Manila Water 
was listed at the Philippine Stock Exchange as the first IPO in the Philippines after the Asian 
financial crisis. 
 
Internal Factors and Water Privatization in Manila: Maynilad vs. Manila Water 
 
Corporate Governance 
A striking feature of corporate governance in Philippines is the concentration of 
economic power in extremely small number of family conglomerates. The largest family 
conglomerate controls 17% of the nation’s total market capitalization; the largest 10 families 
control more than 50% (Wu, 2005). The interlocking nature of corporate control within these 
conglomerates presents special challenges for discipline in the corporate sector (Saldana, 2001). 
 Two of the three largest of these family conglomerates, Lopez and Ayala, became 
involved in the water privatization in Manila. Lopez controlled Maynilad through Benpres 
Holdings, a publicly listed holding company, and Ayala controlled Manila Water through the 
Ayala Corporation, another publicly listed pure holding company. Both conglomerates have used 
pyramiding and cross-holding to control business interests in real estate, banking, construction, 
telecommunication, and electricity production and distribution. 
The involvement of multinational water companies in water privatization in Manila 
added another dimension of complexity to corporate governance of the two concessionaires. 
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Strategic alliances with multinational water companies were considered key inducements for 
Lopez and Ayala to participate, as neither had technical expertise in operating urban water 
systems. The possibility arose, however, that problems might develop from multinational 
partnerships, owing to differences in management styles and corporate cultures. A more 
important consideration was that their interests might not always be aligned, especially likely 
insofar as the participating companies all had other subsidiaries and affiliates whose interests 
might in turn be affected by operational decisions made by the two concessionaires. 
The concessionaires’ responses to these challenges differed markedly. In Maynilad, 
contracts for services and consultancies went largely to Suez and Benpres, as well as to their 
subsidiaries or affiliates. For example, a management consultancy contract went to Lyonnaise des 
Eaux Philippines (LDEP), a subsidiary of Suez; a program management contract went to Safage 
Consulting and Montgomery Watson, both affiliates of Suez; service contracts went to First 
Philippine Balfour Beatty and to Philippine Steel Fabricators, Inc., both subsidiaries of First 
Philippine Holdings Corporation, which is a subsidiary of Benpres Holdings. The size of such 
contracts was often substantial. For example, in 2001, when Maynilad decided to stop paying its 
concession fee because of heavy indebtedness, 11 French consultants were reportedly paid Php 
168 million, of which Php 110 million was for consultancy services (Santiago, 2002).  
Because related-party transactions were shielded from competitive bidding, Maynilad 
incurred exorbitant costs. For example, Maynilad’s computers were purchased from IBM France, 
an affiliate of Suez. Compared with Manila Water, the East Zone concessionaire, Maynilad spent, 
per employee, 80% more on computers (Diokno-Pascual
 
, 2004). Table 4 shows comparatively 
higher operating costs for Maynilad on almost all categories; the exception, utilities cost, is due to 
higher pumping requirements for Manila Water’s service area. It is especially curious that 
Maynilad’s operating costs (see Table 5), especially non-personnel operating costs, actually 
increased dramatically while its financial woes were worsening; one would expect to see exactly 
the opposite in a financially distressed company. And related-party transactions led to more than 
 17 
these high operating expenditures: it aggravated tensions between the two partners (Benpres and 
Suez) that had plagued the water privatization initiative from the very beginning
5
. 
Manila Water, in comparison, has maintained an arm’s-length relationship with 
subsidiaries of Ayala Corporation and other partners in the joint venture. It has outsourced to 
some 75 contracting companies much of its work for replacing outdated water mains and 
repairing leaks; only one of those is affiliated with Ayala Corporation. Manila Water’s more 
successful practices in corporate governance certainly have not gone unnoticed: in 2005 
ASIAMONEY voted it the best-managed company in the small cap category.  
Although a private water company’s management determines the quality of its corporate 
governance practices, the public sector has ample opportunities to influence corporate governance 
practices through the bidding process, regulatory actions, and asset ownership. Government 
officials guiding the bidding process would be wise to pay careful attention to each bidder’s 
corporate governance practices, as these could be an indicator of what how that bidder might 
perform if awarded the contract. Government can also include good corporate governance 
practices in concession agreements. Mark Dumol, a government official who was extensively 
involved in the bidding process in Manila, has particularly emphasized the potential of utilizing 
regulatory tools to constrain bad corporate governance practices: ―If I can rewrite the 
privatization rules, I would put in tougher provisions against the shareholder-related companies’, 
especially the foreign partners’, making a quick buck from transactions with the local 
concessionaire company‖ (The Center for Public Integrity, 2003).  
 In retrospect, benchmark competition established by having two concessionaires seems to 
have worked from the perspective of the public. Having two concessionaires operating in the 
same city and subject to the same political environment not only helped the Regulatory Office to 
overcome the information asymmetry associated with water privatization (and with weak 
regulatory capacity as well), it also offered the concessionaires a yardstick for assessing and 
containing the potential negative impacts of related-party transactions. Perhaps the most 
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important benefit was that the information available through benchmark competition helped to 
dissipate the public’s anxiety in dealing with tariff increases.  
 
Financial Management 
The financial models used by the two concessionaires for the bidding in early 1997 were 
prepared at a time when foreign capital was pouring into the Philippines, begging for investment 
opportunities. The Asian financial crisis abruptly and completely changed the landscape that the 
two new concessionaires confronted. Easy credit was no longer available, and creditors had 
become extremely meticulous in the due-diligence process.  
Manila Water made some critical adjustments to its financial management in response to 
the crisis. First, it focused on domestic lenders for capital expenditure by leveraging on Ayala 
Corporation’s good reputation and successfully settled for small-size loans from several local 
banks, starting at a level of about US$20 million in 1998, and gradually increasing in cumulative 
levels to US$25 million in 1999, US$55 million in 2000, and to US$67 million by 2001. Second, 
it slowed down its capital expenditure considerably as compared to the original bids. Although 
this resulted in Manila Water’s failure to achieve some goals in the early years, the slowdown 
may have been a sensible strategy for protecting the company against substantial financial risk 
before it could tap into less expensive means of financing. Third, Manila Water targeted the areas 
that were most likely to produce financial improvements with a limited amount of capital 
expenditure, such as innovative approaches in reducing NRW.  
Manila Water’s cautious approach to financial management paid off. It is remarkable that 
the company was able to make a profit as early as 1999, when the water in East Zone was still 
selling at a significant discount compared to the pre-privatization level. Small but well-targeted 
capital expenditure right after privatization allowed the company to solidify its bottom line, 
enabling it to secure less expensive financing later on. Manila Water’s capital expenditure has 
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increased significantly after 2002 (Figure 2), which should help it to achieve its targeting in the 
years to come. 
The same prudence in financial management is not evident in the case of Maynilad. It 
focused on immediately securing a huge US$350 million Term Loan from the Asian 
Development Bank, European Investment Bank and a syndicate of foreign commercial banks 
with the participation of COFAGE as political risk insurer, for its capital expenditure projects. 
This strategy failed as the huge borrowing proved to be very difficult to close. The prospective 
long term lenders set stringent conditions and only initially agreed to a US$100 million Bridge 
Loan. 
While this should have allowed the company to make strategic capital investments to 
improve financial performance, the anticipated opportunities never materialized. Despite 
substantial capital expenditure, Maynilad was very slow to attend to some critical aspects in 
improving its financial standing. For example, until 2004 Maynilad did not have a database that 
could provide area-specific estimates of water losses due to theft versus losses due mainly to the 
bad state of pipes and inefficient metering (Esguerra, 2006). In the meantime the negotiation for 
the full term loan became protracted and the large capital investment without resulting 
operational efficiencies have led to more accumulated financial losses that eventually bankrupted 
the company. In March 2003 Maynilad defaulted on its payment of the Bridge Loan, and closure 
of the term loan has inevitably fallen through. 
 
Operations Management 
The two concessionaires jointly inherited a highly centralized organizational structure 
that retained some of the common characteristics of state-owned utility companies in many 
developing countries. Most MWSS employees were accustomed to a system that was rule-based 
and procedure-driven. Consequently they performed their jobs with little concern for 
effectiveness and efficiency (Weldon and Beer, 2000a). To overcome the difficulties of 
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transforming a public utility into customer-driven private water company, Manila Water 
developed strategies centering on a few core objectives: (1) to build a corporate culture focused 
on honesty, effective performance, and customer service; (2) to create a new organizational 
structure with a clear chain of responsibility through decentralized decision making; (3) to alter 
work procedures toward better communication and cooperation; and (4) to establish a reward 
system aligning pay with responsibility and results (Weldon and Beer, 2000b).  
A hallmark of Manila Water’s approach to these objectives was its effort to instill trust 
and confidence in former MWSS employees, which was backed with sufficient retraining and 
support. Instead of treating former MWSS employees as a collateral liability in securing the 
concession contract, Manila Water management viewed them as invaluable and indispensable 
resources for building a strong new company. Rather than relying on imported talent, Manila 
Water sent these veteran employees abroad for training and exposure to relevant operational 
environments (Chortrani, 1999). Similarly, the company’s middle and senior management 
positions were mostly staffed by former MWSS employees, with only a very few top positions 
filled by representatives seconded from Ayala and its foreign partners. The employee-retention 
strategy took hold: more than five years after privatization, 95% of Manila Water personnel were 
former MWSS employees (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 2004). 
Manila Water also adopted several innovative approaches in operations management to 
target NRW. Although improved corporate governance practices and prudent financial 
management helped to control operating costs and capital expenses, a key to the company’s 
financial success was persistent efforts toward reducing NRW, which have directly contributed to 
the revenue increase. Within less than a decade of privatization Manila Water reduced NRW 
significantly, from 58% to 35% of former levels whereas in the West Zone NRW increased from 
64% to 69% (see Figure 3). This dramatic success was mainly due to two innovations in its 
operations management: territory management and the Water for the Community Program.  
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Territory management, a part of Manila Water’s management decentralization initiative, 
partitioned its service areas in the East Zone into smaller and more manageable clearly defined 
territories. The East Zone was divided into seven business areas, which were in turn subdivided 
into a total of 43 operational districts, termed demand monitory zones (DMZs). Each DMZ had 
approximately 10,000 water connections and was subdivided into several district metering areas 
(DMAs), each servicing 500 to 1,000 connections. Each DMA was to be managed by a territory 
team consisting of a territory business manager, DMA officers, meter consumption analysts, site 
officers, and service providers. The territory teams would be responsible for customer services, 
monitoring and control of NRW, and new service development; they also were empowered to 
make decisions pertaining to their customers’ water and wastewater needs, funding, and 
implementation. Because of this clear tiered division of responsibilities, evaluation and 
compensation of employees and managers could be geared to quality of performance. One 
improvement resulting from this structure was quicker response to customer demand. Within a 
few years of its inauguration, average time to repair leaks was reduced to four days in Manila 
Water’s East Zone (compared to 11 days in Maynilad’s West Zone), and 97% of customer service 
complaints were communicated and resolved within 10 days (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 
2004). The territory management system remains in operation today. 
The Water for the Community program (Tubig Para sa Barangay), begun in 1997, 
focused on extending water supply services to areas containing numerous clusters of lower-
income families. Under this program, several households (typically two to five) can share one 
connection and thus split its cost of consumption among them. Where such an arrangement is not 
feasible, one bulk connection is provided to the whole community (up to 100 or more households), 
and costs of connections are shared by all. By 2005, more than 500 projects in the East Zone are 
completed under the program, benefiting approximately 850,000 people in poor communities 
(Manila Water Annual Report, 2005). A unique feature of the initiative is that it brings water only 
to the edge of a community, next to a main road, where shared meters for a group of households, 
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or the entire community’s bulk meter, can be positioned (See Figure 4). Water is then billed at 
volume passing through these meters at the community entry point; it is the responsibility of the 
community to distribute the water from thence to individual households and to protect against 
leakage and illegal connections. Manila Water’s service connections under Tubig Para sa 
Barangay have effectively imposed a zero NRW rule in areas plagued in the past with rampant 
illegal connections. 
Given that private water companies often encounter political opposition to privatization 
in general and to tariff increases in specific, the Water for the Community program helps Manila 
Water to build legitimacy. Because the company has been able to provide water services to poor 
communities that the public water utility had failed to reach, they became political allies in the 
company’s efforts to dissipate opposition to water privatization. The Water for Community 
program also makes business and financial sense for the company. Because Manila Water in 
effect imposes a zero NRW on projects under the program, it has actually helped to reduce 
overall NRW by minimizing illegal connections, leaks, and incidence of water contamination in 
areas where these problems are the most severe. The program has also played an important role in 
attracting support, in the form of in low-interest loans or equity investments, from international 
organizations and foreign government donor organizations concerned with supplying water to the 
poor
6
. The success of the Water for the Community program suggests that the public benefits and 
private sector profit motives may not be inherently incompatible in water privatization. Perhaps 
the most remarkable aspect of this achievement is that projects targeted at water supply for the 
poor were not specified in the 1997 concession contracts.  
The situation was completely different at Maynilad. A large number of employees from 
Benpres Holdings and its subsidiaries were transferred to Maynilad, most of them with no 
experience in the water sector; incomers from Suez took up most of the new company’s 
management positions. Former MWSS employees felt they were being treated as second-class 
citizens in the new company, and morale sank
7
. The company did not invest as much as needed to 
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upgrade its employees’ capabilities; in its first years of operation annual expenditure on such 
training averaged only Php 1,500 (about $US30) per employee (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 
2004). The mentality, mindset, and behavior of former MWSS employees who had remained with 
the company had scarcely changed from pre-privatization levels.
8
  
 Ironically, the idea of territory management had been initiated by employees at Maynilad 
right after the privatization
9
, but the company had passed over this option in favor of a system-
wide approach to dealing with NRW problems
10
. It did not, however, promptly inaugurate a 
centralized monitoring plan for pinpointing leaks in the system: the first reliable and consolidated 
report on leakage was not introduced until 2000 (UTCE and Japan PFI Association, 2004), 
although billions had already been deployed in capital expenditures for laying new pipes.  
Maynilad also created a program for supplying the poor, Water for the Community 
program (Bayan Tubig). Its expansion mode was more ―generous‖ than Manila Water’s: families 
usually received individual connections, with meters near their houses (see Figure 5). This 
arrangement left the lines exposed such that unconnected households could tap into the system 
before the water reached the meter for connected households. In fact, even a connected household 
could decide to tap its own connection before it reached the meter (UTCE and Japan PFI 
Association, 2004). Thus it comes as no surprise that NRW continued to rise in these 
communities as the program expanded. Maynilad eventually halted Bayan Tubig because of the 
financial difficulties the program created.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 While much of criticisms leveled at Manila water privatization have focused on 
significant rate hikes and slower-than-expected service expansion (Buenaventura et al., 2004; 
Esguerra, 2003), the performance of privatization should be assessed in a historical context. It is 
true that both concessionaires raised their water tariffs substantially in their first years of 
operation, but the magnitude of increase in part reflects their extremely low bids: Manila Water’s 
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winning bid was only a quarter of the rate before privatization. Given unforeseen events such as 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the unprecedented drought that afflicted Angat Reservoir, it 
is highly plausible that MWSS would have increased its charges to the same level even had it not 
been privatized, or else the government would have had to assume a substantial financial burden.  
Although the system expansion still falls short of what is specified in the concession 
contracts, the two concessions had increased connections by 30% during the first five years of 
operations, a feat that MWSS would have taken 30 years to achieve on the basis of its historical 
performance. Impressively, much of that expansion occurred in economically distressed areas, 
directly benefiting the urban poor who had formerly relied on more expensive water supply 
alternatives.  
Worker productivity increased significantly after privatization. Consolidated figures for 
the two concessions show that number of staff per 1000 connections dropped from 9.4 in 1996 to 
4.1 in 2003. Both concessionaires managed to resolve over-employment from pre-privatization 
levels through early retirement programs, with little or no social disruption in the corporate 
setting. 
Our investigations show that generalized conclusions about water privatization in Metro 
Manila should not be ventured without carefully differentiating between the two concessionaires. 
There are pluses and minuses in the external factors surrounding water privatization in Manila, 
some of which are related to intellectual discourse beyond the scope of this essay; but Manila 
Water’s more successful experience compared to Maynilad’s suggests that studies focusing on 
external factors alone may be too limited. Water privatization without improvements to 
management systems for the privatized utilities severely reduces the chance of success, even 
under favorable external conditions. On the other hand, Metro Manila’s experience shows that 
innovative management practices in privatized water utilities can help to overcome obstacles 
introduced from the external environment.  
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Our analysis suggests that decisions regarding internal factors such as corporate 
governance, financial management, and operations management were key factors in the divergent 
paths taken by the two concessionaires after privatization. First, while both concessionaires 
involved family conglomerates (Lopez and Ayala) and multinational companies (Suez, United 
Utilities, and Bechtel), corporate governance practices differed considerably between the two 
from the outset. For example, Maynilad generally awarded management and technical 
consultancies to subsidiaries of its French (Suez) and Filipino (Benpres) partners. Such related-
party transactions were partly responsible for internal conflicts reported between the two partners 
but also led to higher costs for start-up and enhancement operations. Manila Water’s trajectory, 
involving few dealings with related parties, avoided such problems. 
Second, the concessionaires’ different financial management practices were critical 
determinants of their success in the years following privatization. In adjusting to the Asian 
financial crisis, Manila Water went for smaller loans at the beginning targeting operating 
efficiency and service improvement, and then gradually scaled up borrowing to produce a 
virtuous financing cycle of investment and efficiency improvement. Although this strategy 
deviated from Manila Water’s contractual commitment to capital expenditure, it shielded the 
company through the turbulent years immediately following the crisis. Maynilad, by contrast, did 
not make similar adjustments, and large capital investment without resulting operational 
efficiencies have led to more accumulated financial losses that eventually bankrupted the 
company.   
Third, the concessionaires’ relative success with water privatization was linked to their 
attention to two critical factors that have seldom been few managed well: the transformation of a 
public utility into a private company, and management of public expectations about the services 
the utility is pledged to deliver. One key to Manila Water’s overall success was that it catered its 
operations management toward these two considerations from the very beginning. Employees 
transferring from MWSS were perceived as having valuable prior experience and were given 
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training to adapt to the new privatized organizational culture and to its innovations, some of 
which, such as territory management, were designed to improve employee performance. Manila 
Water has also been sensitive to objections to water privatization and has made concerted efforts 
to dispel such opposition through initiatives such as its Water for Community program. In 
comparison, Maynilad’s approaches have been less well conceived. For example, management 
and employees imported from outside the preexisting public company often had no experience of 
water supply utilities, and lines installed in poor neighborhoods were not designed to prevent 
unauthorized taps. 
The results of our exploration of the effects of internal factors in water privatization have 
several important policy implications. Analyses that ignores the importance of such internal 
factors may lead either to oversubscription to the general notion of privatization or, conversely, to 
underestimation of its potential for water supply solutions. Privatization will not automatically 
bring efficiency gains unless privatized companies can allocate substantial resources toward 
reorienting internal organization and operations; but to reject privatization outright, on the basis 
of ―inherent‖ incompatibility between the private sector and water business, may deprive the 
public of a valuable option.  
Our emphasis on internal factors is not intended to imply that public policy cannot play 
an active role in shaping the outcome of privatization. On the contrary, there are ample 
opportunities for governments and the regulatory agencies to influence private corporate 
decisions on internal factors through the bidding process, through regulatory actions, and through 
asset ownership (in the case of concessions).  
We also point out that the importance of internal factors to the quality of performance by 
water concessionaires in Metro Manila, the subject of our study here, offers some encouragement 
to municipalities struggling with failing public utilities and an unfavorable external environment 
for water privatization. By learning from the best practices of privatized water utilities, public 
utilities can envision and achieve improvements in water services through internal restructuring 
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within the public context. The current slowdown in privatization does not mean that public water 
utilities should remain unchanged. Manila Water’s successful tactics show that innovation in 
internal management, especially attention to performance incentives and rewards for experienced 
personnel, can help to close the gaps in water services to the urban poor.  
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
 Pyramiding is defined as owning a majority of a stock of one corporation that in turn 
holds a majority of the stock of another, a process that can be repeated a number of times; cross-
holding is defined as a company further down the chain of control having come shares in another 
company in the same business group (Claessens, Djankov, and Fan, 2002).  
 
2
 Nonrevenue water (NRW) refers to water that is not billed because of leakage through 
holes in the pipes, illegal connections, or measurement problems due to faulty meters. 
  
3
 The concession fees were split 90–10 between Maynilad and Manila Water, reflecting 
the utilization ratio of capital from MWSS’ borrowings prior to the privatization. It was expected 
that Manila Water (East Zone) would incur higher capital expenditure because it included new 
development areas where connections were yet to be installed. Few connections were envisioned 
for the West Zone (Fabbela, 2006) 
 
4
 The heavier burden fell to Maynilad because of the 90–10 split in concession fees. 
 
5
 Interview with a senior manager in Maynilad, July 2006.  
 
6
 Interview with Mr. Tony Aquino, CEO of Manila Water, May 2006. 
 
7
 Interview with a senior official in MWSS Regulatory Office, July 2006. 
 
8
 Interview with Ms. Macra Cruz, Deputy Administrator of MWSS, July 2006. 
 
9
 Interview with Mr. Tony Aquino, CEO of Manila Water, May 2006. 
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(% of pop) 
Nonrevenue water 
(NRW) 
(% of production) 
Staff/1000 
connections 
Manila 10.6 16 58.7 63 9.8 
Singapore 3.0 24 100 7 2.0 
Hong Kong 6.3 24 100 36 2.8 
Seoul 10.6 24 100 35 2.3 
Kuala Lumpur 1.4 24 100 36 1.4 
Bangkok 7.3 24 82 38 4.6 
 
 
Source: Second Water Utilities Data Bank, Asian and Pacific Region, Asian Development Bank, 




Table 2. Bids received, and winning bids 
 
Pre-Privatization Rate Php 8.56 
West Zone  Bids  
Ayala–International Water  Php 2.5140  
Benpres–Lyonnaise des Eaux (Maynilad) Php 4.9688 
Winning bid  
Aboitiz–Compagnie Générale des Eaux  Php 4.9941  
Metro Pacific–Anglian Water International Php 5.8738  
East Zone Bids 
Ayala–International Water (Manila Water) Php 2.3169  
Winning bid 
Aboitiz–Compagnie Générale des Eaux  Php 5.5209  
Metro Pacific–Anglian Water International  Php 5.6638  




Table 3. History of Tariff Rates before and after Water Privatization (Php per cubic meter) 
 
 Average Base Tariff  Average All-in Tariff* 
   Pre-privatization 8.56 8.78 
Post-Privatization Manila Water Maynilad Manila Water Maynilad 
1997-1998 2.32 4.96 4.02 7.21 
1999 2.61 5.80 4.37 8.23 
2000 2.76 6.13 4.55 8.63 
2001 2.95 6.58 4.78 9.17 
2002 4.51 11.39 9.37 19.92 
2003 10.06 11.39 13.38 19.92 
2004 10.40 11.39 14.00 19.92 
2005 13.95 19.72 18.55 30.19 
2006 14.94 21.12 19.73 32.34 
 
Source: MWSS Regulatory Office 
 
*All-in Tariff=Base Tariff + CERA (Currency Exchange Rate Adjustment) + FCDA (Foreign 




Table 4. Operating costs, Maynilad and Manila Water (2000) 
 
  Manila Water Maynilad 
Average annual staff wage (Php) 304,673 403,674 
Utilities cost (Php/m
3
 billed) 0.37 0.15 
Services (Php/m
3
 billed) 0.23 0.26 
Chemicals (Php/m
3
 billed)  0.13 0.17 
Materials and supplies (Php/m
3
 billed) 0.13 0.17 
 








(Php per cubic meter) 
Personnel cost/BWV 
(Php per cubic meter) 
Nonpersonnel cost/BWV 







1997 7.20 6.43 4.10 4.93 3.10 1.50 
1998 6.15 5.15 2.64 4.79 3.50 2.36 
1999 5.12 7.03 2.33 4.65 2.78 2.38 
2000 4.79 6.70 2.17 4.17 2.63 2.53 
2001 4.52 7.20 1.87 3.48 2.65 3.72 
2002 5.06 9.47 2.33 4.30 2.73 5.17 
 
 
Data Source: MWSS Regulatory Office 
 
*OPEX: Operating Expenditure 
**BWV: Billed Water Volume 
 
 
